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ADJUSTING EARNINGS AND PROFITS
UNDER INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTION 312(e)
INTRODUCTION
"Earnings and profits" was first utilized as a term of art in the
realm of corporate taxation in the Revenue Act of 1916.' A section
of that Act provided, without elaboration, that "'dividends' . . .
shall be held to mean any distribution made or ordered to be made
by a corporation. . . out of its earnings or profits .... ,,2 Earnings
and profits thus serves as a determinant of the tax effect of a distri-
bution made in the ordinary course of business by a corporation to
its shareholders. To the extent that there are corporate earnings and
profits, a distribution will be taxed as a dividend to the sharehold-
ers.3 Where the amount of the distribution exceeds existing earnings
and profits, however, shareholders will be treated as having received
either a nontaxable return of capital or the gain from the sale or
exchange of a capital asset. 4 The amount of earnings and profits is
equally significant to the corporation. If earnings and profits are
permitted to accumulate beyond the "reasonable needs of the busi-
ness," 5 the corporate entity will subject itself to the harsh conse-
quences of the accumulated earnings tax.6
I Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757.
2 Id. The Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166, taxed all distributions
without regard to their source. Id. § II(B)[1]. Shortly after the March 1, 1913 effective date
of the Act, the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Lynch v. Turrish, 236 F. 653 (8th Cir. 1916),
aff'd, 247 U.S. 221 (1918), raised doubts as to the constitutionality of taxing distributions
derived from earnings of the corporation accumulated prior to the 1913 Act. Congress thereu-
pon enacted § 2(a).
I See I.R.C. § 316(a). To a noncorporate shareholder, dividends are fully includable in
gross income, id. § 61(a)(7), except to the extent of the $100 exclusion provided by I.R.C. §
116(a). The corporate shareholder includes the full amount in gross income, id. § 61(a)(7),
but is permitted a deduction in the amount of 85% of the dividends so included in gross
income. Id. § 243(a)(1). Thus, only 15% of the dividends received will be taxable as income
to a corporate shareholder.
See id. § 301(c). I.R.C. § 301(c)(2) provides: "That portion of the distribution which is
not a dividend shall be applied against and reduce the adjusted basis of the stock." Thus,
upon a subsequent sale of the stock, the portion of the distribution treated as a reduction in
the shareholder's basis will take on the characteristics of any gain or loss then incurred. Under
I.R.C. § 30(c)(3)(A), "that portion of the distribution which is not a dividend, to the extent
that it exceeds the adjusted basis of the stock, shall be treated as gain from the sale or
exchange of property." In the hands of the ordinary investor, such gain will be treated as the
gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset, see id. § 1221, and, depending on the length
of time the shareholder has held the stock, will be taxed as either a long- or short-term capital
gain. See id. § 1222(1), (3).
Id. § 537.
Id. §§ 531-537. The accumulated earnings tax is imposed in addition to the other taxes
19771 ADJUSTING EARNINGS AND PROFITS
Although no definition of the term appears in the Internal Rev-
enue Code, certain transactions and events which affect earnings
and profits are enumerated therein.7 This legislative guidance, cou-
pled with the insight that may be culled from judicial decisions," has
lent some measure of clarity to the concept of earnings and profits.
Basically, earnings and profits represents the aggregate of the an-
nual noncapital increases or decreases in the net worth of a corpora-
tion Since the characterization of a distribution as a dividend is
contingent upon the presence of earnings and profits, a distribution
treated as a dividend will reduce the amount of corporate earnings
and profits available for subsequent dividend distributions.0
Prior to 1924, all distributions were conclusively presumed to
have been derived from the most recently accumulated earnings and
profits." In that year, however, Congress, apparently recognizing
that some distributions may constitute, at least in part, a return of
the shareholders' investments, enacted section 201(c) of the Reve-
nue Act of 1924.12 Under this section, amounts distributed in partial
or complete liquidation of a corporation were treated as payments
for which the corporation is liable. The tax is "equal to the sum of-(1) 271/ percent of the
accumulated taxable income not in excess of $100,000 .... " Id. § 531. The definition of
"accumulated taxable income" is designed to approximate the excess of the increase in a
corporation's assets during the taxable year over the "reasonable needs of the business." See
id. § 535.
7 I.R.C. § 312 is the principle Code section delineating the increase or decrease to earn-
ings and profits occasioned by various transactions. The section includes provisions for reduc-
ing earnings and profits upon distributions by the corporation to its shareholders, id. § 312(a)-
(e), increasing or decreasing earnings and profits when gain or loss from the sale of property
is recognized, id. § 312(0(1), and limiting the amount of depreciation which can be taken
into account in the computation of earnings and profits, id. § 312(k). Treas. Reg. § 1.312
(1977), provides illustrations of the manner in which many of § 312's provisions operate. By
comparing earnings and profits to "surplus" and providing that "the amount of earnings and
profits. . . will be dependent upon the method of accounting properly employed in comput-
ing taxable income (or net income as the case may be)," Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(a) (1960)
indicates a possible starting point for the computation of earnings and profits. It is only
through this vague reference to taxable income that the Code and Regulations intimate that
the expenses of the business reduce earnings and profits.
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wheeler, 324 U.S. 542 (1945); Divine v. Commissioner, 500
F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974); Stark v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 122 (1957).
1 See Zarky & Biblin, The Role of Earnings and Profits in the Tax Law, 18 MAJOR TAX
PLAN. 145, 147 (1966) (current earnings and profits equals taxable income plus nontaxable
income less nondeductible expenses and federal income taxes). For discussions of the ordinar-
ily occurring charges to earnings and profits, see McDaniel, Earnings and Profits: More Than
a Cold Accounting Concept: Additions to and Subtractions From, 32 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX. 445 (1974); Schweitzer, Earnings and Profits: Decisions, Rulings Offer Guidance to
Computation and Planning, 36 J. TAX. 102 (1972).
10 See I.R.C. § 312(a).
" Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18, § 201(b), 40 Stat. 1059 (1919).
12 Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 255.
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made in exchange for its stock.'3 As a consequence, the amount
received by a shareholder under such a distribution would be enti-
tled to capital gain treatment. If these distributions were chargeable
solely to earnings and profits, an artificial reduction of earnings and
profits would be occasioned thereby,'4 possibly resulting in a subse-
quent distribution being deemed in whole or in part a tax free return
of capital.' 5 It thus became clear that distributions in partial or
complete liquidation, as distinguished from ordinary dividend dis-
tributions, could not be charged entirely to earnings and profits. In
recognition of this factor, Congress provided in section 201(c) of the
Revenue Act of 1924 that "the part of such distribution which is
properly chargeable to capital account shall not be considered a
distribution of earnings or profits . . . for the purpose of determin-
ing the taxability of subsequent distributions by the corporation."'
The present version of this rule is embodied in section 312(e)
of the Internal Revenue Code. By virtue of the Revenue Act of 1954,
this section is applicable to redemptions consummated under sec-
tions 302(a)' 7 and 303,11 in addition to liquidations. Except for this
11 Id. Section 201(c) provided in pertinent part: "Amounts distributed in complete liqui-
dation of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock, and
amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in part or full
payment in exchange for the stock." Id. § 201(c). Section 201(g) of the Act defined a partial
liquidation as "a distribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of a
part of its stock, or one of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or redemption of
all or a portion of its stock." Id. § 201(g). The scope of the partial liquidation concept has
since been substantially expanded. See I.R.C. § 346.
Significantly, a distribution treated as a payment in exchange for stock is deemed to have
originated in a sale or exchange of a capital asset, and thus qualifies for the capital gains
deduction of I.R.C. § 1202 and the alternative tax treatment of § 1201. Such treatment is
clearly advantageous to a noncorporate shareholder. A corporate shareholder might not prefer
sale or exchange treatment, however, since the § 1202 capital gains deduction is not available
to corporations. Moreover, the corporation is entitled to an 85% deduction for dividends
received, id. § 243, while it is taxed to the full extent of the gain received from a distribution
in partial liquidation. Thus, whenever a corporate shareholder's basis is less than 85% of the
amount distributed to it, a smaller tax will result to it under dividend taxation, and its basis
with respect to its remaining shares will not be reduced.
" See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
" See text accompanying note 4 supra.
" Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, ch. 234, § 201(c), 43 Stat. 255.
'7 I.R.C. § 302 exempts from dividend treatment certain distributions in redemption of
a shareholder's stock. Id. § 302(a). The redemptions which qualify are those which are: "not
essentially equivalent to a dividend," id. § 302(b)(1); "substantially disproportionate with
respect to the shareholder," id. 302(b)(2)(A), within'the meaning of § 302(b)(2); in complete
termination of the shareholder's interest, id. § 302(b)(3); and "of stock issued by a railroad
corporation .. .pursuant to a plan of reorganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act," id. § 302(b)(4). Although § 302(b)(2)-(4) provides a relatively objective standard for
determining inclusion under § 302(a), a large body of case law has evolved dealing with the
determination of "dividend equivalence" in applying § 302(b)(1). See, e.g., United States v.
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broadening of its scope, the statutory language has remained almost
unchanged since its initial enactment as section 201(c) in 1924.
Upon examining this language, it becomes evident that the opera-
tion of section 312(e) hinges on the meaning assigned to the phrase
"amount properly chargeable to capital account." As these words
were not defined by Congress and are not explained in the relevant
Treasury Regulations,"9 some controversy with respect to their im-
port has developed. In the main, there have emerged three distinct
solutions to the problems posed by the lack of an authoritative
definition. This Note will examine these three approaches, focusing
upon the manner in which each would determine the amount of a
distribution properly chargeable to earnings and profits. Each ap-
proach then will be analyzed in light of existing expressions of legis-
lative and judicial opinion. Finally, a suggestion as to the most
appropriate formula for determining earnings and profits under sec-
tion 312(e) will be offered.
THE THREE APPROACHES TO CALCULATING EARNINGS AND PROFITS
UNDER SECTION 312(e)
Jarvis v. Commissioner
The initial decisions involving the predecessor to section 312(e)
dealt with the effect of earnings and profits accumulated prior to
March 1, 1913, the effective date of the Revenue Act of 1913.21 It was
not until the 1941 Board of Tax Appeals decision in Jarvis v.
Commissioner2 that the courts were called upon to determine the
amount properly chargeable to capital in a situation uncolored by
the presence of pre-1913 earnings and profits.
Jarvis arose in a relatively uncomplicated factual setting. The
taxpayer contested a determination by the Commissioner that in-
come received from distributions in 1935 was fully taxable as divi-
Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970); Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974), aff'd, 535 F.2d
500 (9th Cir. 1976); Haserot v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 864 (1966). See also Bacon, Share
Redemptions by Publicly Held Companies: A New Look at Dividend Equivalence, 26 TAX L.
REv. 283 (1970); Golden, The Dividend Equivalence Test: Forty Years of Confusion, 43 TEx.
L. REV. 755 (1965).
1' I.R.C. § 303 is a unique provision which prescribes exchange treatment for the proceeds
received from a redemption of stock which is part of the estate of a decedent, to the extent
that the proceeds do not excede the estate, inheritance, legacy and succession taxes, and the
funeral and administration expenses of the estate.
," See Treas. Reg. § 1.312-5 (1960).
0 See, e.g., Foster v. United States, 303 U.S. 118 (1938); Horrmann v. Commissioner,
34 B.T.A. 1178 (1936); Stewart v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 809 (1934).
21 43 B.T.A. 439, aff'd sub nom. Helvering v. Jarvis, 123 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1941).
19771
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
dends, claiming that a partial liquidation in 1934 had so reduced
corporate earnings and profits as to render a part of the distributions
a return of capital.22 The corporation, upon whose shares the distri-
butions were made, had been organized in 1915 and had issued
10,000 shares of $100 par value common stock in that year, in ex-
change for securities having a value of $2,112,299. At the same time,
it also assumed obligations of its sole shareholder totalling $200,800.
In 1934, 1000 shares, 10 percent of those issued and outstanding,
were redeemed for a total consideration of $1,160,000. In accounting
for this transaction, the company had charged the par value of the
redeemed shares, $100,000, to its capital account, and the remaining
$1,060,000 paid out in the redemption to earnings and profits,
thereby reducing its accumulated earnings and profits as of Decem-
ber 31, 1934 to $388,152.67. Between January 1 and May 14, 1935,
the company's earnings and profits amounted to $206,589.79, while
its ordinary distributions totaled $1,053,000. Jarvis contended that
earnings and profits had been eliminated as of May 14, and that the
$435,150 distributed during the remainder of 1935 was includable in
gross income only to the extent of $349,183.56, the earnings and
profits earned after May 14, 1935.2 The government argued that the
proper manner to account for the 1934 redemption was to charge it
in full to the capital account, without reducing earnings and profits
until capital was exhausted.24 In the alternative, the government
contended that the redemption price included unrealized apprecia-
tion of the corporation's assets, which, to the extent attributable to
the redeemed shares, should not be charged to earnings and prof-
its. 2.
Rejecting both of the arguments advanced by the government,
the Jarvis board found that "[the corporation] has but one 'capital
11 43 B.T.A. at 443-44.
21 Id. at 440-44. An examination of contentions of the taxpayer in Jarvis reveals that the
modern concept of prorating current earnings and profits over the distributions for the entire
year and then applying the previously accumulated earnings and profits as available at the
date of distribution, Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2(b), (c), had not yet been adopted. Under the
present Regulations, the amount of dividend income to Jarvis would equal the same amount
as that determined by the Board. If, however, the earnings and profits for the period from
May 14 to December 31 had exceeded the distributions during that period, then the approach
used in Jarvis would result in taxation of a smaller amount as dividends than the Regulations
now permit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2(b), (c) (1960).
24 See 43 B.T.A. at 444. The government based its argument on the Supreme Court's
decision in Foster v. United States, 303 U.S. 118 (1938), discussed in notes 62-74 and accom-
panying text infra. See Edelstein & Korbel, The Impact of Redemption and Liquidation
Distributions on Earnings and Profits: Tax Accounting Aberrations Under Section 312(e), 20
TAX. L. REV. 479, 491-96 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Edelstein & Korbel].
r, See Edelstein & Korbel, supra note 24, at 497 n.75.
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account' and that account consists of the original amount received
for its capital stock, comprising both the par value and the paid-in
surplus .... -2" The Board went on to determine that the proper
charge to capital was 10 percent of the original consideration re-
ceived for the stock, as 10 percent represented the percentage of
shares involved in the redemption, while the balance of the distribu-
tion was chargeable to earnings and profits .2 Employing similar
reasoning, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the Board.28
Woodward Investment Company v. Commissioner
Within a year of the Jarvis decision the Board of Tax Appeals,
in Woodward Investment Company v. Commissioner,29 was pre-
sented with another opportunity to determine the proper charge to
earnings and profits in a partial liquidation situation. The precise
issue in Woodward concerned the proper amount allowable to the
corporation as a dividends paid credit under section 27(f) of the
Revenue Act of 1936.0 Under this provision, a corporation was af-
forded a tax credit for a fraction of the amount distributed as divi-
dends during the tax year." Included in those distributions qualify-
ing for the credit was that part of a liquidation distribution
"properly chargeable to earnings or profits. 32 The amount properly
chargeable to earnings or profits was the amount of the distribution
less the part "properly chargeable to capital account."3 Thus, in
disposing of the tax credit question, the Board had to make a 312(e)-
like determination as to the proper charge to earnings and profits.
The Woodward company had made a liquidating distribution
of property having a basis of $112,800, 31 at a time when its earnings
1 43 B.T.A. at 444 (citing Horrmann v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1178, 1186-87 (1936);
Stifel v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 1145, 1150 (1934)).
43 B.T.A. at 445.
Helvering v. Jarvis, 123 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1941).
46 B.T.A. 648 (1942).
Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 740, ch. 690, § 27(f), 49 Stat. 1665.
' See id. § 27(b).
2 Id. § 27(f).
13 Id. § 115(c), 49 Stat. 1687-88. Although a dividends-paid credit is not available under
current law, corporations are now afforded a deduction for dividends paid, I.R.C. §§ 561-565,
including the portion of a liquidating distribution properly chargeable to earnings and profits,
in computing the accumulated earnings tax, id. § 535(a), and the personal holding company
tax, id. § 545(a). Therefore, the law which developed under section 27(f) remains significant.
" Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 740, ch. 690, § 115(c), 49 Stat. 1687. Included in the
definition of complete liquidation is "any one of a series of distributions made by a corpora-
tion in complete cancellation or redemption of all of its stock in accordance with a bona fide
1977]
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and profits equalled $218,223.95 and its total capital including
earned surplus aggregated $445,661.27. 31 In determining the amount
of this distribution properly chargeable to earnings and profits, the
Board fashioned a new approach, finding the Jarvis rule inappli-
cable where, as in the instant case, no shares have been redeemed.
Pursuant to this new formula, the Board charged earnings and
profits by that amount which bore the same ratio to the distribu-
tion as accumulated earnings and profits bore to total capital and
surplus. The amount was determined as follows:3"
Accumulated Earnings and Profits
($218,233.95) Amount of
Total Capital and Surplus X Distribution
($445,661.27) ($112,800)
Revenue Ruling 70-531
Shortly after Woodward, the government abandoned the posi-
tion that a distribution in redemption or partial liquidation should
be charged fully to capital without any reduction in earnings and
profits until capital has been exhausted. 7 At the same time, the
Internal Revenue Service acquiesced in the Jarvis and Woodward
decisions38 stating that the two cases "are not inconsistent, . . .
[but] merely reflect necessary differences in the application of a
general principle to different . . . situations." 9 The Service
plan of liquidation. ... Id. Such a distribution would now be embraced within the defini-
tion of partial liquidation. See I.R.C. § 346(a)(1).
5 46 B.T.A. at 649. The total capital and earned surplus was derived as follows:
Capital Stock ........................................ $150,000.00
Paid-In Surplus ........................................ 21,000.00
Pre-1913 Earned Surplus ................................... 6,563.25
Appreciation at March, 1, 1913, realized in later years ........... 49,874.07
Post-1913 Earned Surplus ....................... _.218,223.95
Total .. . . ............. . $445,661.27
Id. The sole shareholder of the Woodward Company had a cost basis in her shares of
$424,300. Since her basis exceeded the amount of the 1936 distribution, the distribution was
treated as a return of capital and the shareholder realized no gain as a result of it. Id. Based
on this fact, the Commissioner argued that it was inappropriate to permit the corporation a
dividends-paid credit. Id. at 650. The Board dismissed the Commissioner's contention, find-
ing no relationship between the credit and the existence or nonexistence of taxable gain to
the shareholder. Id. at 651.
Id. at 652.
See G.C.M. 23460, 1942-2 C.B. 190.
* 1942-2 C.B. 10, 20.
3' G.C.M. 23460, 1942-2 C.B. 190, 191.
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abruptly reversed itself again some years later in Revenue Ruling
70-531,40 withdrawing its previous acquiescence to Jarvis4' and
Woodward 2 and establishing a new formula for determining the
proper charge to earnings and profits. Apparently designed to elimi-
nate any charge to earnings and profits resulting from unrealized
appreciation, 3 the Revenue Ruling provided that any difference
between the amount distributed and the ratable share of both the
paid-in capital and the earnings and profits-i. e., unrealized appre-
ciation and other "similar attributes"-should be included in the
capital account." Reasoning from this definition of capital account,
the Revenue Ruling concluded that the proper charge to earnings
and profits is the amount of the earnings and profits ratably attrib-
utable to the shares redeemed, regardless of the amount of the dis-
tribution or the amount of paid-in capital. 5
Somewhat unclear is the intent of the Internal Revenue Service
in withdrawing its acquiescence to Woodward and substituting in
Rev. Rul. 70-531, 1970-2 C.B. 76.
" 1970-2 C.B. xxii.
,' 1970-2 C.B. xxi.
4 In Rev. Rul. 70-531, 1970-2 C.B. 76, 78, the Service asserted that its construction of §
312(e) was "consistent with the purposes of the predecessors of section 312(e) and section 316
of the Code to prevent tax avoidance." The tax avoidance which concerned the Service was
the tax benefit realized by the shareholders from reduced earnings and profits. Compared to
the Jarvis and Woodward formulas, the Revenue Ruling's effect is to reduce the amount
chargeable to earnings and profits in a situation where the amount distributed exceeds the
book value of the shares redeemed. According to an example cited in Revenue Ruling 70-531,
such an excess is attributable to unrealized appreciation. Id.
41 Id. In determining capital account for purposes of § 312(e), the Service looked to the
description found in Treas. Reg. § 1.562-1(b)(1)(ii) (1970). That Regulation defines capital
account, for purposes of the dividends-paid deduction, to include the "stock's proper share
of the paid-in surplus and such other corporate items, if any, which, for purposes of income
taxation, are treated like capital in that they are not taxable dividends when distributed but
are applied against and reduce the basis of the stock." These "other items" or "similar
attributes" were said to include pre-1913 earnings and profits, "appreciation at March 1,
1913 realized in subsequent years," and unrealized appreciation. Rev. Rul. 70-531, 1970-2
C.B. 76, 78.
,1 This can be algebraically demonstrated as follows:
X = the proper charge to earnings and profits.
D = the amount distributed in redemption.
C= the amount of the capital account ratably attributed to the shares redeemed,
including unrealized appreciation and similar attributes.
P = the amount of paid-in capital attributable to the shares redeemed.
E = the amount of earnings and profits ratably attributed to the shares redeemed.
Then:
X=D-C
Since:
C=P+[D-(P+E)],or C=D-E
Then substituting for C:
X =D - D + E, or
X =E.
Thus, the proper charge to earnings and profits under the Revenue Ruling is the amount of
the earnings and profits ratably attributable to the shares redeemed.
1977]
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its stead an "acquiescence in result only."46 The term acquiescence
in result only has been defined as "acceptance of the decision of the
Court but disagreement with some or all of the reasons assigned for
the decision."47 Since the capital account concept employed by the
Woodward Board did not include any unrealized appreciation,"
the Service by its action seems to have opted for a rather curious
position; while requiring inclusion of unrealized appreciation in the
capital account where an actual redemption occurs, the Service did
not object to the, Woodward Board's failure to make this inclusion
where the distribution was made ratably to all outstanding shares.49
A Summary of the Three Approaches
The interrelationship of and differences among the three ap-
proaches can best be illustrated by example. Therefore, the follow-
ing hypothetical facts will be referred to throughout the remainder
of this Note:
Corporation X has two shareholders, A and B, each of whom own
10 shares of $2 par value common stock. The records of X reveal
the following:
Assets (basis) ................................... $100
L iabilities ......................................... 0
Earnings and Profits .............................. $60
Stated Capital (20 shares at $2 par) ................ $40
Paid-In Surplus .................................... 0
X's assets have increased in value to $200, indicating unrealized
appreciation of $100. X will redeem 5 of A's shares for what A
believes to be their value, $50, one-fourth of the value of the assets
of X.
Under Jarvis, the capital account equals $40. As 25 percent of
X's stock is being redeemed, the charge to capital is 25 percent of
$40, or $10. The balance of the distribution, $40, is charged to earn-
ings and profits, reducing that account to $20. The Woodward for-
mula also operates upon a capital account of $40. Earnings and
profits would be reduced by an amount which bears the same ratio
to the total distribution, $50, as earnings and profits, $60, bears to
the sum of earnings and profits and paid-in capital, $60 + $40.
4' 1970-2 C.B. at xxi.
,7 Id. at xxii n.4.
" See note 35 supra.
, See notes 78-82 and accompanying text infra.
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Thus, the charge to earnings and profits would be computed as
follows:
$50 x $60 = $30
$100
The balance in the earnings and profits account would be $30. The
Revenue Ruling would charge earnings and profits by that portion
of total earnings and profits, $60, attributable to the shares re-
deemed. As one-fourth of X's shares are being redeemed, applica-
tion of the Ruling would reduce earnings and profits by one-fourth,
or $15, leaving a balance in that account of $45.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
It is no easy task to discern the intent of Congress in enacting
the original version of section 312(e) or in leaving the section sub-
stantially unaltered despite the many tax reform measures which
have ensued. The original language of section 201(c) of the Revenue
Act of 1924 makes manifest, however, that the primary concern of
Congress was "the taxability of subsequent distributions." 5 Al-
though this language was deleted in 1936,5" there is no reason to
presume that the taxability consideration no longer was deemed
relevant.
In the House 2 and Senate53 committee reports on the Revenue
Act of 1924, reference was made to the language of section 201(c)
excluding from the charge to earnings and profits the amount pro-
perly chargeable to capital: "[T]he provisions . . . represent what
is probably the correct construction of the existing law and unques-
tionably what is in accord with business practice."5 Although this
language would seem to indicate only that some charge to capital
was in accord with then existing business practice, a few commenta-
tors have unsuccessfully attempted to identify the amount of the
charge under accounting practices existing in 1924, inferring from
the committee reports that Congress meant to adopt that method
" Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, ch. 234, § 201(c), 43 Stat. 255. See note 13 supra.
5, See Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 740, ch. 690, § 115(c), 49 Stat. 1687. It has been
suggested that the language was deleted due to the relationship between the dividends-paid
credit and the charge to earnings and profits. See Edelstein & Korbel, supra note 24, at 482
n.11.
.2 See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1924) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 179], quoted in part in Edelstein & Korbel, supra note 24, at 482.
S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1924) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No
398], quoted in Edelstein & Korbel, supra note 24, at 482-83.
.' H.R. REP. No 179, supra note 52, at 11-12; S. Rep. No. 398, supra note 53, at 11-12.
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of computation.55 Similarly, attempts by these authorities to apply
present accounting principles to section 312(e) have produced con-
flicting results. 6
The House and Senate reports accompanying the 1924 Act also
contained an example demonstrating that a redemption of stock at
its par value "does not affect earnings and profits of the corporation
on hand for subsequent distribution. '" 57 Under both the Woodward
and Revenue Ruling formulas, however, a redemption at par would
call for some reduction in earnings and profits. This result can be
demonstrated by employing the hypothetical facts previously set
forth, with one minor alteration: five of A's shares are now being
redeemed for their aggregate par value, $10. Woodward would com-
pute the charge to earnings and profits as follows:
$1o x $60 =$6
$100
The balance of the distribution, $4, wouf'd be charged to capital.
The approach set forth by Revenue Ruling 70-531 would reduce
earnings and profits by that portion of earnings and profits attribut-
able to the shares redeemed, which equals $15. Since the charge
exceeds the amount distributed, there is no reduction of capital
account. It is only under Jarvis that the result suggested by the
congressional reports is obtained, i.e., capital is reduced by par and
there is no reduction in earnings and profits.
As the authority of these early expressions of congressional in-
tent may be discounted due to the novelty of the earnings and
profits concept as well as the general lack of expertise with income
tax legislation, an examination of the case law in the area should
prove helpful. The initial court decisions construing the predeces-
sors to section 312(e) were concerned with the treatment of pre-1913
earnings and profits. 8 Relying in great part on the language added
to the Code by the Revenue Act of 1918,11 which provided that
"[a]ny distribution . . . shall be deemed to have been made from
See, e.g., Edelstein & Korbel, supra note 24, at 487-88.
Compare Rev. Rul. 70-531, 1970-2 C.B. 76, 78, and McCoy, Revenue Ruling 70-531:
Another View, 26 TAX L. REv. 864, 869-70 (1971), with Edelstein, Revenue Ruling 70-531:
Section 312(e) Revisited, 26 TAx L. Rlv. 855, 857-58 (1971).
11 H.R. REP. No. 179, supra note 52, at 11-12; S. REP. No. 398, supra note 53, at 11-12.
See, e.g., Helvering v. Craig, 1937 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 37,052, remanded mem., 97 F.2d
1004 (8th Cir. 1938); Horrmann v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1178 (1936); Stewart v. Commis-
sioner, 29 B.T.A. 809 (1934).
11 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18, § 201(b), 40 Stat. 1059 (1919). This
language can still be found in substantially unaltered form at I.R.C. § 316(a).
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earnings or profits accumulated since February 28, 1913 . . .
these cases had held that the distribution should first be charged
against the portion of the paid-in capital standing behind the shares
redeemed, and the entire balance of the distribution should then be
charged to post-1913 earnings and profits. Only after the latter ac-
count was exhausted would the remainder of the distribution be
charged to pre-1913 earnings and profits. 1
The Supreme Court rejected this view in Foster v. United
States,6" holding that the capital account included both pre-1913
earnings and profits and appreciation. The corporation in Foster
had distributed $1,025,000 in redemption of one-fourth of its out-
standing capital stock. The paid-in capital of the corporation to-
talled $200,000, its pre-1913 earnings and profits plus appreciation
as of March 1, 1913 were in excess of $3,725,000, and its post-1913
earnings and profits equalled $330,578.98.63 The taxpayer contended
that the distribution was chargeable to paid-in capital to the extent
of the par value of the shares redeemed, $50,000, and then to post-
1913 earnings and profits, thereby eliminating that account. 64 The
basis for this contention was section 115(b) of the Revenue Act of
1928,65 which stated that "all distributions are paid from 'the most
recently accumulated earnings or profits.' ,66
The Court rejected the taxpayer's argument, finding that the
clear intent underlying section 115(b) was to ensure "that pre-1913
accumulations . . ..- not be distributed 'in such a fashion as to per-
mit profits accumulated after that date to escape taxation,' "67 and
that to construe the section as the petitioner requested "would facil-
itate the escape of such profits from taxation and thereby defeat the
undoubted purpose of Congress."66 Noting further that "[w]e must
not give effect to any contrivance which would defeat a tax Congress
plainly intended to impose . . . [and that] bookkeeping terms and
accounting forms and devices cannot be permitted to devitalize
valid tax laws,"69 the Foster Court held there should be no reduction
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18, § 201(b), 40 Stat. 1059 (1919).
" See cases cited in note 58 supra.
62 303 U.S. 118 (1938).
13 Id. at 119.
61 Id.
Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 562, ch. 852, § 115(b), 45 Stat. 822.
66 303 U.S. at 120 (quoting Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 562, ch. 852, § 115(b), 45
Stat. 822).
, 303 U.S. at 120 (quoting Helvering v. Canfield, 291 U.S. 163, 168 (1934)).
303 U.S. at 120.
Id. at 121.
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in post-1913 accumulations, and that pre-1913 earnings and profits
were includable in the capital account.7"
The importance of Foster lies not in its holding that the capital
account includes pre-1913 earnings and profits, nor in the Court's
decision not to reduce earnings and profits until the full amount of
capital attributable to the redeemed shares had been eliminated.
Rather, the major significance of the case lies in the Court's finding
that the legislative intent behind the dividend and earnings and
profits provisions of the Code was to prohibit the use of redemption
distributions as a device to reduce the post-1913 earnings and profits
account and thereby permit subsequent distributions to be made
tax-free.
In articulating the facts, the Foster Court noted that paid-in
capital was $200,000, the amount of the distribution was $1,025,000,
and the pre-1913 earnings and profits were in excess of $3,725,000.
The extent of this excess was not indicated. If the capital account,
including pre-1913 earnings and profits, is reduced by one-fourth
(the percentage of the capital stock redeemed), there remains
$43,750 of the distribution to be charged to some account. Yet the
Court failed to reduce post-1913 earnings and profits by any
amount. It would seem, therefore, that the Court believed pre-1913
earnings and profits were substantially greater than $3,725,000, or
that the Court was charging the capital account in full and not pro
rata to the shares redeemed. 71 This aspect of the Foster decision
formed the basis of the government's contention in Jarvis that the
distribution in its entirety should be charged against capital. In
rejecting this position, the Board of Tax Appeals in Jarvis found
that Foster was limited to situations in which pre-1913 earnings and
profits existed, 72 stating: "The present case involves no opportunity
to escape a tax by a bookkeeping device. '73 As previously illus-
trated, however, the formula applied by the Jarvis Board allows
unrealized appreciation to reduce the earnings and profits account,
thus permitting subsequent distributions to be made tax free. This
clearly results in an escape from taxation. Furthermore, the Board's
reading of Foster is questionable; the language of Foster was not
limited in any manner to situations involving pre-1913 earnings and
profits. The Foster Court emphasized that "[w]e must not give
effect to any contrivance which would defeat a tax Congress plainly
10 Id. at 122.
7 See Edelstein & Korbel, supra note 24, at 494.
72 43 B.T.A. at 444.
73 Id.
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intended to impose," indicating that items which would have been
taxable before the distribution should be taxable thereafter.
IMPLEMENTING THE INTENT OF CONGRESS
It is suggested that in implementing congressional intent as
expounded in the Foster decision, taxing authorities should pay
heed to the tax burden of the shareholders remaining after a distri-
bution in redemption or partial liquidation. If properly utilized,
section 312(e) should prevent tax avoidance while providing equita-
ble treatment for the remaining shareholders. Particular attention
should be focused upon the possibility of subsequent ordinary distri-
butions being taxed as dividends where, had there been no redemp-
tion or partial liquidation, such distributions would have been
treated as a return of capital to the shareholder. For instance, if
corporation X in the hypothetical facts were not permitted to reduce
earnings and profits upon the redemption of five of A's shares, upon
a subsequent ordinary distribution of $4 per outstanding share B
would be treated as having received $40 in dividend income. Had
there been an ordinary distribution of $4 per share without a prior
redemption since X had only $60 of earnings and profits and distrib-
uted $80 to A and B, only $30 of the $40 received by B would be a
dividend. The remaining $10 distributed would either reduce B's
basis in his shares or be taxed as a gain from the sale or exchange
of a capital asset. Thus, to put B in the same position in which he
would have been in the absence of a redemption, the balance of the
earnings and profits account must be $45, which would create divi-
dend income only to the extent of $3 per outstanding share. This
precise result would be reached under the formula prescribed by
Revenue Ruling 70-531.
Application of the Revenue Ruling in a situation involving un-
realized appreciation, however, leads to only an approximation of
the desired result. In the hypothetical facts, if X realizes $12 of
previously unrealized appreciation subsequent to the redemption,
its earnings and profits will be increased by the same amount. Had
there been no redemption, X's earnings and profits would be $72
($60 + $12), and on a $4 per share ordinary distribution, $3.60 would
be taxed as a dividend. To obtain this same result after a redemp-
tion of five shares, X's earnings and profits would have to equal $54.
As computed previously, the Revenue Ruling produces a balance in
71 303 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added).
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the earnings and profits account of $45 immediately after the distri-
bution, which increases to $57 upon realization of the $12 apprecia-
tion. As a result, the remaining shareholders will bear a heavier tax
burden than they would have in the absence of the redemption. The
$3 difference between the desired result ($54) and the result actually
obtained under the Ruling may be traced to the portion of the now
realized appreciation attributable to the shares redeemed (one-
fourth of $12). Thus, to ensure equitable treatment of the remaining
shareholders, items of appreciation unrealized at the time of the
redemption should be identified and, upon their subsequent realiza-
tion, the portions attributable to the shares redeemed should be
excluded from the increase to earnings and profits. As a practical
matter, however, attributing unrealized appreciation to specific
pieces of property upon each redemption and carrying this informa-
tion in a corporation's records until realization would be an almost
impossible task.
Recognizing the impracticality of such an approach, commen-
tators have suggested a more feasible alternative which would sat-
isfy the goal of equitably taxing outstanding shares.75 This alterna-
tive would establish an earnings and profits deferral account consis-
ting of any difference between the amount distributed and the book
value (the pro rata share of paid-in capital plus earnings and prof-
its) of the shares redeemed. Each year following the redemption, a
percentage of the current earnings and profits would be applied
against the deferral account until the latter was exhausted. The
percentage utilized in this calculation would equal the percentage
of stock that had been redeemed. Using the hypothetical facts as an
illustration, upon a redemption of one-fourth of X's outstanding
shares for $50, $25 (the amount of the distribution exceeding book
value) would be placed in a new deferral account. If X has $12 of
current earnings and profits the following year, one-fourth of that
amount, $3, would be applied against the deferral account, which
would be reduced to $22. The $9 balance of current earnings and
profits, in accordance with normal procedures, would be applied to
the earnings and profits account. This process would be repeated
annually until the balance in the deferral account was fully de-
pleted.
Where shares are redeemed at less than book value, the Reve-
" See Edelstein & Korbel, supra note 24, at 521-25; Jocoby, Earnings and Profits: A Not
So Theoretical Concept-Some Winds of Change, 29 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx. 649, 656-58
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Winds of Change].
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nue Ruling formula produces an equitable result, while the Jarvis
and Woodward standards penalize the remaining shareholders.
Consider, for instance, the result when X redeems one-half of A's
shares for $16, $9 below the book value. Jarvis charges capital $10
and earnings and profits by the balance of the distribution, $6. This
leaves a balance in the earnings and profits account of $54. Had
there been no redemption, B would have incurred taxable dividend
income on only the first $30 of ordinary distributions. Following the
redemption, under the Jarvis approach, the first $36 of subsequent
ordinary distributions is taxed as dividends to B. Similarly, under
Woodward, the charge to earnings and profits is:
$16 x $60 = $9.60
$100
The balance in the earnings and profits account is $50.40. Conse-
quently, B will realize dividend income on the first $33.60 subse-
quently distributed, while in the absence of the redemption he
would have been so taxed on only the first $30.
The Revenue Ruling approach, with the modification sug-
gested, thus is readily applicable to redemptions or partial liquida-
tions in which shares are surrendered. 76 Since this formulation is
predicated upon the existence of an ascertainable percentage of ex-
changed shares, however, it is unworkable where the distribution in
partial liquidation does not produce a change in the number of
outstanding shares. In fashioning a formula for this situation, it is
important to note that upon a distribution in partial or complete
liquidation, earnings and profits will be distributed without being
taxed as dividends to the shareholders.7 7 Therefore, after each distri-
bution, some reduction in earnings and profits is warranted. Since
the charge to earnings and profits in partial liquidations is com-
, The approach of Revenue Ruling 70-531 presents difficulties when the corporation
exchanges appreciated property for shares. I.R.C. § 311(d)(1) provides that gain will be
recognized to the distributing corporation to the extent of the excess of the fair market value
of the distributed property over its adjusted basis. Where gain is recognized, the current
year's earnings and profits are increased, and consequently, the charge to earnings and profits
under the Revenue Ruling is greater. See Rev. Rul. 70-531, 1970-2 C.B. 76. After such a
redemption, the remaining shareholder's portion of the earnings and profits increases due to
the realization of the appreciation. This result, however, is in accord with Congress's intent
to treat the distribution of appreciated property in a redemption as a true realization event.
The result, at least with respect to noncorporate shareholders, is the same as that reached in
the situation where the corporation has sold the property and distributed the proceeds.
Where the redemption with appreciated property falls into one of the exceptions of §
311(d)(2), resulting in no gain to the distributing corporation, a modified deferral approach,
see note 75 and accompanying text supra, seems necessary.
" See I.R.C. §§ 331, 346.
19771
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
puted using the basis to the corporation of the property distrib-
uted,7" it would seem reasonable to premise the amount of the
charge upon the percentage, in terms of basis, of the assets distrib-
uted."9 For example, if one-fourth of the corporate assets are distrib-
uted in partial liquidation, earnings and profits should be reduced
by the same proportion. Under this approach, the result obtained
is approximately the same as that produced by Woodward. By re-
ducing earnings and profits by that portion of the amount distrib-
uted which bears the same ratio to the total distribution as earnings
and profits bears to the sum of earnings and profits plus paid-in
capital, the Woodward Board implicitly recognized that the sum
of earnings and profits plus paid-in capital will equal the total net
basis of the assets of the corporation." Although it may deviate
somewhat, such sum does tend to approximate net assets.' Perhaps
this accounts for the Internal Revenue Service's withdrawal of its
general acquiescence to Woodward and substitution of an acquiesc-
ence in result only.82
The above suggestion concerning the proper treatment of pro
rata distributions in partial liquidation was contained in the House
version of the Revenue Act of 1954 as a proposed amendment to the
predecessor of section 312(e). This amendment directed a reduction
in earnings and profits proportionate to the reduction in the net
assets of the corporation on a distribution in redemption or partial
liquidation. 3 The proposal was rejected by the Senate, which found
Id. § 312(a)(3).
" This formulation was proposed by the House in 1954 as a revision to § 312(e). See notes
83-85 and accompanying text infra.
0 Cf. Edelstein & Korbel, supra note 24, at 505-06. But see Winds of Change, supra note
75, at 653, wherein the author cautioned that reliance on the balance sheet earned surplus
account, which when added to the financial capital account equals the net assets, as an
indicator of earnings and profits may be unwise. As the author suggested, the concept of
capital for balance sheet purposes may differ greatly from the notion of capital employed for
312(e) calculations.
It is generally conceded that capital includes the amount paid-in for the stock issued,
plus any pre-1913 appreciation in the value of the assets of the corporation and pre-1913
earnings and profits. Treas. Reg. § 1.562-1(b)(1)(ii) (1960). Differing interpretations of the
phrase "amount paid-in" have been suggested, ranging from the par or stated value of the
stock plus surplus to the corporation's basis in the assets contributed. Compare Treas. Reg.
§ 1.562-1(b)(1)(ii) (1960), with Edelstein & Korbel, supra note 24, at 510-12.
81 Since I.R.C. § 312(k) limits the charge to earnings and profits for depreciation to the
amount computed under the straight line method, the sum of earnings and profits plus paid-
in capital will not equal the total net basis of the assets of the corporation if the corporation
uses the declining balance method of depreciation.
', See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
'3 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A95-96, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG.
& Ad. News 4233. The bill provided that the earnings and profits of the distributing corpora-
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"that existing administrative practice, making these determina-
tions as the facts of each case may indicate, has been successful in
achieving correct results."" As of 1954, however, existing adminis-
trative practice recognized two approaches: the Jarvis approach
where shares were redeemed or surrendered, and the Woodward
approach where the number of shares outstanding did not change. 5
The Senate language with respect to a case-by-case determination
therefore seems to indicate a lack of awareness of the existing ad-
ministrative practice. Furthermore, the correctness of the results
achieved under Jarvis and Woodward is open to serious question.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Tax Court, in Anderson v. Commissioner,8" was recently
presented with a situation calling for a choice between the ap-
proaches of Jarvis and Revenue Ruling 70-531. 87 The case involved
a section 302(a) redemption wherein the distributing corporation
used par value plus the pro rata portion of paid-in surplus attribu-
table to the shares redeemed as the amount properly chargeable to
capital account. The balance of the distribution was charged in full
to earnings and profits.88 Consequently, on a redemption of 17 per-
cent of the common stock, earnings and profits were reduced from
$1,487,182 to $990,241, a reduction of 33 percent.89 One and one-half
years later the corporation redeemed all 1710 shares of its $100 par
preferred stock, which had no paid-in surplus, for $411,733.90 The
tion should be reduced
by an amount which bears the same ratio to the earnings and profits immediately
prior to the transaction which the adjusted basis of the assets (plus the amount of
money and the principal amount of securities, if any) distributed bears to the
adjusted basis of the total assets immediately prior to the distribution ....
Id., quoted in Edelstein & Korbel, supra note 24, at 505.
11 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 11954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4678, quoted in Edelstein & Korbel, supra note 24, at 506.
G.C.M. 23460, 1942-2 C.B. 190.
P 67 T.C. 522 (1976).
In Enoch v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 781 (1972), the Tax Court applied Jarvis in com-
puting the charge to earnings and profits on a redemption distribution. The only reference
that the court made to Revenue Ruling 70-531 was in a footnote, wherein it was stated: "We
realize that. . . we have not followed the approach suggested by the Commissioner in Rev.
Rul. 70-531. . . ." Id. at 802 n.15. The government apparently chose not to argue the validity
of the Ruling, but rather only contended that the distribution was a dividend and not a
redemption. See Reid, To What Extent Will Distributions in Redemption of Stock Reduce
Earnings and Profits?, 42 J. TAx. 29 (1975).
' 67 T.C. at 533, 541.
" Id. at 533.
Id. at 541. The government argued in the alternative that the corporation had misap-
plied Jarvis in computing the charge to capital. The corporation's initial capital account
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excess of the distribution over the aggregate par value of the shares
redeemed was charged to earnings and profits. In upholding these
charges and rejecting the Revenue Ruling, the court employed a
two-part rationale. Observing that under Revenue Ruling 70-531 the
charge to earnings and profits is computed first without reference
to capital account, after which the charge to the capital account is
determined, the Anderson court found that the language of the stat-
ute requires the charge to capital account to be computed first, with
the balance of the distribution being charged to earnings and prof-
its." In addition, the Tax Court concluded that the Senate's rejec-
tion of the proposed amendment to 312(e) in 1954 indicated legisla-
tive approval of the Jarvis approach. 2
It is suggested that the Anderson court's decision is highly ques-
tionable. Section 312(e) as originally enacted provided: "In the case
of amounts distributed in partial liquidation . . . the part of such
distribution which is properly chargeable to capital account shall
not be considered a distribution of earnings or profits . . .,.
Strictly construed, this language leaves doubt as to whether the
charge to capital must be computed before the charge to earnings
and profits. The statute does clearly establish that some portion of
a distribution may be chargeable to capital rather than earnings and
profits. In view of these factors, it would seem that the Revenue
Ruling is not inconsistent with the statutory language.
CONCLUSION
The most significant interpretation of section 312(e) voiced to
consisted of:
(i) 2,500 shares of $1 par value class A common stock ($2,500) with paid-in
capital of $16,704 attributable thereto.
(ii) 7,500 shares of $1 par value class B common stock ($7,500) with paid-in
capital of $50,110 attributable thereto.
(iii) 1,710 shares of $100 par value preferred stock ($171,000) with no paid-in
capital attributable thereto.
Id. at 530. The preferred shares were entitled to par at liquidation, were redeemable at the
option of management for one share of common plus a pro rata portion of earned surplus,
and were cumulative and participating with respect to dividends. Id. at 531. Arguing that
the preferred shares and their par values should be included with the common and treated
equally with the latter in the 312(e) computation, the Commissioner stressed the redeemable
nature and dividend rights of the preferred shares. Id. at 542. The court rejected this conten-
tion, holdingthat "if the paid-in capital ... is clearly attributable to specifically distinguish-
able classes of stock, the proper charge to 'capital account' should be made to the capital
account which represents the class of stock being redeemed." Id. at 543.
Id. at 539-40.
' Id. at 541.
" Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, ch. 234, § 201(c), 43 Stat. 255.
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date is the Supreme Court's concise statement in Foster v. United
States:" "We must not give effect to any contrivance which would
defeat a tax [the tax on dividends] Congress plainly intended to
impose." 5 It is submitted that Revenue Ruling 70-531, as modified
by the use of a deferral account," accomplishes the Foster objective
in the redemption situation, prohibiting the tax-free distribution of
earnings and profits normally taxable as dividends. By its own
terms, however, the Ruling is inapplicable in the case of a distribu-
tion in partial liquidation where no shares are surrendered;" in such
a situation, it defers to the result reached in Woodward, which
approximates the desired result.18
While the Tax Court in Anderson conceded that the Internal
Revenue Service interpretation yields an equitable result, 9 the
court unfortunately failed to implement that formula. Even though
it thus will not be given effect by the Tax Court, the Ruling seems
to fall well within the broad parameters of section 312(e). Moreover,
no definitive expression of Congress appears to preclude the applica-
tion of this approach.110 Presented with a proper factual situation,
' 303 U.S. 118 (1938), discussed in notes 62-74 and accompanying text supra.
303 U.S. at 121.
" See text accompanying note 75 supra.
' See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
" See notes 78-82 and accompanying text supra.
67 T.C. at 541 n.27.
200 Three major arguments against the Revenue Ruling formula have surfaced. These
arguments, all premised to some extent upon legislative intent, are that Revenue Ruling 70-
531 renders the term capital account meaningless, see note 90 and accompanying text supra,
that the wording of section 312(e) requires the charge to capital account to be computed
before the charge to earnings and profits, see notes 91-93 and accompanying text supra, and
that in enacting the Revenue Act of 1954 the Senate rejected a proposed amendment to
section 312(e), finding "that existing administrative practice . . . has been successful in
achieving correct results." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4678, discussed at notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
One authority has based an argument upon the Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
834, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., which added what is now I.R.C. § 312(j)(3):
If a foreign investment company. . . distributes amounts in partial liquidation or
in a redemption to which section 302(a) or 303 applies, the part of such distribution
which is properly chargeable to earnings and profits shall be an amount which is
not in excess of the ratable share of the earnings and profits of the company accu-
mulated after February 28, 1913, attributable to the stock so redeemed.
I.R.C. § 312(j)(3). According to this commentator, since Congress specifically amended the
provisions with respect to foreign investment companies, yet left section 312(e) unchanged,
it "reiterated, at least sub silentio, its acceptance of the then existing rules for the application
of section 312(e)." Edelstein, Revenue Ruling 70-531: Section 312(e) Revisited, 26 TAX L. Ray.
855, 859 (1971). In response to this contention, it may be argued that because Congress was
primarily concerned with the provisions involving foreign-related income, see McCoy,
Revenue Ruling 70-531: Another View, 26 TAx L. REv. 864, 871 (1971), it could not reasonably
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an appellate court favorably inclined toward protecting tax revenue
could and should adopt Revenue Ruling 70-531.
Mark L. Regante
have been expected to amend section 312(e) at that time. Furthermore, section 312(j)(3) may
merely represent "a congressional desire to avoid the uncertainty and inequity of the various
precedents under section 312(e)." Id. at 870.
